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ABSTRACT
This essay reviews Margaret Jane Radin’s BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT,
VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (Princeton Press, 2013). It responds
to two of the book’s principal complaints against boilerplate consumer
contracts: that they modify people’s rights without true agreement to, or
even minimal knowledge of, their terms; and that the provisions they
unilaterally enact are substantively intolerable. I argue, counter
intuitively, that contracts with long fine prints are no more complex and
baffling to consumers than any alternative boilerplate free templates of
contracting. Therefore, there is no alternative universe in which
consumers enter simpler contracts better informed of the legal terms. In
addition, I argue that any policy that mandates consumer friendlier
arrangements (such as ones that eliminate boilerplate arbitration clauses,
warranty disclaimers, or data collection) would hurt consumers in an
unintended but potentially costly way.
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Review of
Margaret Jane Radin, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE
RULE OF LAW (Princeton University Press 2013)

INTRODUCTION
You have to salute Peggy Radin. She has said what others who agree with her
have for so long been hesitant to utter out loud: the fine print is not a contract.1 There is
no agreement to it, no real consent, not even “blanket assent.” It is nothing but
paperwork and should have the legal effect of junk mail.
Those lengthy, unreadable pages with terms and conditions that come pre
packed with consumer products, or demand to be clicked (“I Accept”) on computer
screens – does any one really think that they contain arrangements that people
knowingly agreed to? How is it, then, that such unreadable and unread documents have
become so powerful and effective in regulating the rights and obligations of contracting
parties? Entire areas of law—contract default rules, sales law, privacy law, and copyright
fair use (to name a few)—have been “deleted” by carefully drafted documents that
replace the pro consumer provisions of these laws with pro business arrangements. And
if the fine print is so offensive to our legal universe of fair and balanced default rules,
why is it so radical to propose that it should be invalid? Is the practice of fine print so
deeply rooted in our commerce—so much of our economy relies on the fine print as the
ultimate regulation of trade—that it is too big to curtail?
Let’s end the pretense, says Radin, and restore a sensible conception of
“agreement” to our commercial life. Because boilerplates do not represent informed
consent, because they are divorced from our intuitive understanding of agreement,
because they divest people of their democratically enacted entitlements, they degrade
the institution of contract that is justified by its respect for individual autonomy and
private control. Therefore, boilerplates should be powerless to govern people’s rights.
“They should be declared invalid in toto, and recipients should be governed by the
Leo and Eileen Herzel Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
There were, of course, similar previous opinions. See, e.g., W. David Slawson, Standard Form
Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 529 (1971).
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background legal default rules” (p. 213). And to make sure that firms stop shoving such
offensive paperwork in front of people, a new tort of “intentional deprivation of legal
rights” should operate as a deterrent.
There are two ways to assess the phenomenon of regulation through
boilerplate. The first approach is to ask how such one sided dictation of terms by firms
fits within a liberal account of good social order, of democratic control and participation,
and of individual autonomy. Many of those adopting this perspective, and Radin
prominently among them, are critical of boilerplate and find the process as well as its
consequences intolerable. I need a term for those favoring this approach, and I will
borrow the term “Autonomists.”2 It necessarily includes a variety of views about the
role of regulation in safeguarding the autonomy of individuals, but it is a useful
generalization because so many commentators share a basic commitment to it as a
foundation for normative claims.
Radin’s book is an autonomist manifesto, in that it identifies the normative and
democratic “degradation” that boilerplates impose. It views the exercise of boilerplate
contracting as anything but a dignified, autonomous, agreement. Boilerplates destroy
both the public aspects of private law, namely, those “placed in the care of the polity for
the benefit of the polity as a whole” (p. 212), as well as the possibility of meaningful
private ordering. Bilaterally negotiated agreements are replaced by unilateral directed
take it or leave it corpuses of legal terms.
Radin’s account projects the familiar complaint against “contracts of adhesion”
and “unequal bargaining power” onto a foundational liberal political mapping. Even
within the dense autonomist literature bemoaning the evils of boilerplate, now
embracing vast legal commentary and court decisions, Radin’s account is a milestone
because it does not shy away from raising the stakes. Because boilerplate allegedly
destroys the very justification for enforcing private contracts, two implications for the
appropriate legal response emerge. First, boilerplate contracts should not be enforced,
period. Gone is the hesitant voice of other autonomists who propose tentative tweaks,
and invoke subtle distinctions between garden variety and truly harsh boilerplate. The
scheme itself violates good social order and has to be outlawed. Second, in a bold and
surprising move, Radin goes a step further. The practice of boilerplate deletion of rights
should be regarded as an intentional tort! Boilerplate renders the product to which it is
attached defective because is makes the legal features nonfunctional, it makes the firm
immune from liability and thus numb to its clients’ interests, and the overall purchase
becomes less safe for consumers. “Being a recipient of boilerplate, . . . is often more like
being hit by a one of thousands of dumped projectiles than it is like entering into a
relationship with the entity that dumped them” (p. 210). In the same way that the torts
of defamation or deprivation of privacy protect people from non physical injuries, here,
too, the harm inflicted by boilerplate is the degradation of basic rights secured by the
2
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polity. A commission of this tort of “intentional deprivation of basic legal rights” should
lead to remedies like statutory damages and attorney fees.
If autonomism focuses on the degradation of passive surrender to the fine print,
the second approach to the phenomenon of regulation by boilerplate is to ask how it
affects the well being and satisfaction of consumers who buy products co packed with
boilerplate. It is an approach largely numb to the inherent political value of private
order, control, or “voice.” There is also no per se value in having some terms enacted by
the polity, rather than by the parties. Instead, this approach measures the boilerplate
phenomenon by its effect on consumers’ “payoffs.” What matters is the substance of
the deal, its cost to consumers, the ease by which profitable deals are formed, and the
opportunities to realize benefits from trade. I also need a term for those who favor this
perspective (myself—I’ll reveal now—among them), and I’ll borrow Radin’s somewhat
derogatory term –“Boilerplate Apologists.” Boilerplate apologists regard the fine print as
merely a feature of mass produced products, and a welfare increasing feature at that—
reducing transactions costs, prices, and allowing firms to focus on improving product
features that people actually care about.
Radin’s argument poses two challenges for the boilerplate apologist. The first
challenge is the problem of ignorance—how can people be obligated to terms that are
impossible to know and appreciate in advance? How could such terms match their
preferences? The second challenge is the problem of intolerable terms—why should
baseline legal entitlements be replaced with harsh one sided arrangements? In the
course of addressing these issues, the wisdom of Radin’s proposed remedies—non
enforceability of boilerplate and the tort remedy—will be evaluated.
In the hope that this Essay will not merely reproduce the autonomist versus
apologist shouting match, my plan is to accept the autonomists’ premise. That is, I will
assume that there is something offensive about being bound to terms that you did not
know about. The social experience of receiving fine print is annoying, alienating, and
even degrading. But what can be done about it? Do the reforms and remedies proposed
by autonomists improve people’s well being? Their sense of dignity and control? Or, in
an unintended fashion, might they make things worse? I will offer words of caution,
urging autonomists to consider some of the less desirable but inevitable consequences
of a boilerplate free universe.
I.

BOILERPLATE AND THE PROBLEM OF IGNORANCE

The problem with boilerplate begins with the assertion that there is no consent
to it. The basic problem is what Radin calls “sheer ignorance.” (p. 21) Because consumer
transactions may be completed without even seeing and signing the fine print, and
surely without reading it, people don’t know that it exists, what it says, or that “they are
being divested of important legal rights.” (p. 22) This ignorance is compounded by
asymmetric sophistication, by the limited rationality of consumers, and by the striking

absence of non boilerplate alternatives. In all, self serving drafters sit at their corporate
headquarters and disseminate documents that override the democratically enacted
law—the set of background rights that are granted to their customers.
Boilerplate is not an agreement, but rather a “devolution or decay of the concept
of voluntariness” (p. 30). Destroyed in the course of boilerplate contracting, Radin
argues, are not only the arrangements that background legal rules (like implied
warranties and make whole damages) offer. Rather, the process of deleting rights
without informed consent undermines “private ordering”—the regime empowering
private parties to “legislate” their own affairs. If consumers don’t negotiate, don’t
participate, and don’t even know the terms of transaction—if these sacraments of
contracting are replaced by post hoc paperwork—there is no meaningful private
ordering. Without informed consent, freedom of contract is meaningless, and the ideal
of individual autonomy that justifies the contractual framework is crippled.
There is a subtle notion of the “public” sphere that underlies Radin’s complaint
against boilerplate. The terms that appear in boilerplates substitute an entire fabric of
legal rules that would otherwise govern. While private parties are permitted to modify
these background rules—they are default, not mandatory, rules—alienability should be
a meaningful process of quid pro quo. Existing “right deletion schemes” condemn
fallback entitlements without any fair compensation, political accountability, or
transparency. Thus, for example, remedies for breach of contract, implied warranties,
the rights to control one’s personal data, to make fair use of purchased digital content,
or the rights to seek redress in a public forum—all are mechanisms granted by the polity
though a democratic process to people for the purpose of maintaining a “grand bargain”
and a balance of power between countervailing interests. “Firms that use contracts to
destroy the ideal of contractual ordering are effectively undermining the rule of law and
contributing to democratic degradation” (p. 39).
“Sheer ignorance” is the most intense state of non consent – a “situation where
a person’s entitlement is being divested, but the person does not know that it is
happening” (p. 21). Radin illustrates this degradation by a case in which a hospital used
cell tissue that it removed from a person’s body to develop therapy and make profit,
without the person’s knowledge. Such sheer ignorance undermines the validity of a
contract in the same way that coercion and fraud do—and they all lack the normative
underpinning for contractual enforcement.
This world of sheer ignorance is contrasted with the alternative of informed
consent—the elaborate disclosure regime serving medical patients prior to health
treatments. When informed consent is invited, the patient knows that something of
significance is about to happen, that it entails risks, and that the option to forgo the
treatment exists (pp. 21, 89). In fact, the absence of informed consent could render the
medical treatment a bodily assault, actionable in tort law. Because a boilerplate scheme
denies people similar opportunity of informed consent—it is like wheeling people into

operating rooms while unconscious—it defies the basis of an autonomous action and
thus cannot be regarded as an agreement. And, like unconsented medical invasion, it
should be penalized by tort law.
Unfortunately, this dichotomy—boilerplate’s ignorance versus informed
consent—is based on at least two misguided perceptions, two myths. The first myth has
to do with boilerplate’s complexity. It emerges from a naïve notion that in the non
boilerplate world people know the terms of their contract better. The second myth has
to do with the possibility of informed consent, as a true alternative to the world of
boilerplate. Let me examine, and dispel, these two myths.
Myth #1: Boilerplate is more Complex
There is a compelling logic and evidence supporting autonomists’ claims that
boilerplate is a more complex and therefore a less comprehensible template than a
simple agreement between, say, Sally and John, to purchase John’s bicycle for $120 (this
is Radin’s generic example). The difference in complexity is obvious: a dozen pages of
legal language in small print versus a candid “OK, it’s a deal, I’ll buy your bike for $120.”
But this superficial comparison between the two templates of a deal is incorrect.
In fact, both deals are similarly complex, and in both deals people harbor just as much
“sheer ignorance.” In general, the complexity of the contract, and the resulting level of
ignorance, have nothing to do with the boilerplate scheme. The ordinary contracts from
the romantic era of pre boilerplate—the client who hires a local messenger to deliver a
package to a nearby village, or agrees with a small time carpenter to construct a cabinet
(let’s call these the “village contracts”)—are surprisingly complex, and sometimes leave
more uncertainty than the thick boilerplate of the mass contract era.
How can this be? The reason is simple. While not summarized in a long
preprinted form, the deal between Sally and John, or any village contract, are far richer
than their express terms reveal. True, the express terms are often no longer than one
sentence: the identification of the good (“my bike”), the price (“$120”), and a statement
of consent (“it’s a deal”). The express terms include none of the staples of boilerplate
contracting: none of the legal terms, the conditions, the assumptions of risk, the
instructions for courts. But the legally enforceable contract—the set of obligations that
John and Sally undertook by manifesting their one sentence assent—does include an
abundantly complex legal matter. Rather than provided and summarized by one party in
a term sheet, the legal matter of the village contract is provided by other legal sources:
default rules and gap fillers, local customs and market norms, and an intense fabric of
regulations governing the trade of that particular good.
John and Sally’s contract does not have a warranty certificate in boilerplate
language with ugly ALLCAPS, but if some defect surfaces, its resolution would depend on
a set of provisions collected under the law of implied warranties. Specifically, because

this is a sale of goods, it contains an implied warranty of merchantability, and truth be
told it is a fairly complex warranty since the bike is probably used, and in such cases it is
hard draw the exact lines of the assurance that the buyer gets, if at all.3 White &
Summers treatise on sales law covers 254 pages in describing the various contours of
the law of product warranties.4 The warranty paragraph in the firm drafted boilerplate
is the acme of simplicity relative to this background legal mass.
Similarly, John and Sally’s contract does not stipulate expressly the damage
measures for its breach, but it of course contains all the legally supplied default
remedies, including expectation and consequential damages, reliance and restitution
damages, and the substantive rules concerning the election of remedy. Unlike the
boilerplate remedy clauses, which are often short and plain (even if stingy)—repair or
replace, or restitution of the price paid—the legally supplied damages that attach to the
village contracts are quite complex given that the liability for consequential damage is
notoriously hard to draw. Just ask the ultimate villagers, Hadley and Baxendale.5 For
example, is John liable for Sally’s injuries if the wheel of the bike is shabbily attached
and she falls and gets hurt? Or, what is Sally obligated to do to mitigate her losses in
case John is late in the delivery of the bike?
Boilerplates are loaded with terms governing contingent and remote problems in
performance, but these contingencies are just as probable (or improbable) in the village
contract. And so the village contract contains terms derived from background legal
principles regarding countless “just in case” issues: rejection of nonconforming goods,
inspection rights, seller’s right to cure nonmaterial defects, what constitutes material
breach, interest for delayed payment, risk of loss in the interim period prior to delivery,
passage of title, and lots more. None of these terms are mentioned expressly between
the parties, but they are no less part of the relationship as are boilerplate terms
attached to the mass contract.
In fact, the complexity of the romantic village contract is probably greater,
compared to boilerplate, because the absence of a comprehensive sheet of terms opens
the door for various and overlapping supplementary sources. The village contract, for
example, is supplemented by customary terms and local norms. This means that the
parties’ obligations are to be found not in a printed text, but in unwritten “context”—in
some empirical regularity generally followed by people in this market, or by the present
parties in their past dealings. Boilerplate is simpler because it often excludes such
moving targets, such fuzzy sources of obligation (hence the “no waiver” and “no oral
modification” clauses). The village contract, by relying on customs to fill its gaps—by
replacing the formalism of textual sources with the flexibility and realism of commercial
3
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practice as a source of obligation—allows for much nuance. But it also leads to added
complexity, when the content of the obligation is so fluid.
What about choice of law and arbitration? Boilerplates, recall, often include
paragraphs assigning jurisdiction over the disputes to an arbitration forum and choosing
a particular state law. John and Sally’s bike contract says nothing about these issues and
so, as Radin explains in her Prologue, “Sally can bring John to court in a place convenient
for her” (p. xiii). The default arrangement is public courts jurisdiction, under the rules
governing conflicts of laws. This regime incorporates common law standards of
convenient forums and choice of law—an entire area of (often complex) jurisdiction
principles. Is the boilerplate paragraph stipulating arbitration really more complex?
Longer? Less understandable? Does it engender more “sheer ignorance” than the village
contract’s dispute resolution gap fillers?
While not written in a preprinted form, the one sentence village deal
precipitates a lengthy and complicated contract. Regulation by boilerplates means that
one web of terms collected from many sources of law (the legally supplied default
provisions) is replaced with a fairly comprehensive but concise substitute (boilerplate).
The boilerplate version appears more complicated, but this is a superficial veneer, due
to the fact that boilerplates reproduce the entire set of governing rules in print. In fact,
the boilerplate version is often less complicated because the legally supplied default
rules that are part of the village contract are more vague and open ended (i.e.,
standard based) than the mass market fine print with its bright line, rule based
arrangements.
Myth #2: Boilerplate Can Be Replaced with Informed Consent
Autonomists think that deals can be done differently. Instead of shoving lengthy
piles of paperwork in front of ignorant consumers, meaningful agreement has to be
thoughtfully and individually obtained. The “sheer ignorance” that pervades boilerplate
is contrasted with the principle of informed consent, whereby “the information required
about what is happening to the patient must be detailed and understood by the patient
before consent will be deemed to exist” (p. 89). Sheer ignorance is “similar” to lack of
informed consent because in both “the information needed in order to understand
significant parameters of a situation are not available to a person” (pp. 21 22). If
informed consent could govern medical relationships, why not all contracts?
In contract law, informed consent means that people should be able to opt out
of legally supplied default rules and agree to the terms that the firm proposes, but such
opt outs cannot be done in wholesale boilerplate fashion. Instead, they have to be a
result of an informed, deliberate action. Freedom of contract would be a caricature if,
for example, the opt outs are written in Chinese. The fact that the opt outs are written
in English is no less blatantly inconsistent with the autonomy of consumers, because the
boilerplate legalese is similarly inaccessible. Thus, commentators who believe in the

informed consent principle insist, for example, that borrowers’ acceptance of non
standard risky mortgages should be unenforceable unless they received “honest and
comprehensible disclosures from brokers and or lenders about the terms and risks of
the alternative mortgage.”6
In my work with Carl Schneider, we have sharply disputed the premise that such
“comprehensible” or “meaningful” disclosures exist.7 Even in the area of medical
treatments, informed consent practices fail to accomplish autonomists’ naïve notions of
meaningful shared decisionmaking. In fact, we argued that informed medical consent is
no different than consumer boilerplate, or any other mandated disclosure. We
marshaled mountains of social science evidence showing that the vast majority of
patients don’t read or use the medical disclosures. We argued that these consent forms
are strikingly similar to boilerplate, written (often by lawyers) in the same technical
language, and at comparable lengths, as loan agreements and software licenses. We
showed that people’s levels of numeracy and literacy make even the simplest of these
“informed” consent documents largely impenetrable and useless to them. But most
fundamentally, we argued that the ideal of informed consent is impossible to achieve
when a true understanding of the decision requires experience, background knowledge,
intuition, and technical mastery, which only experts have. Put simply, to decide whether
a particular loan is a good idea, or whether a particular medical treatment is suitable,
requires far more tutoring than even the most “meaningful” or “heightened” ritual of
disclosure can accomplish. It is the complexity of the decision that undermines the
project of informed consent, not some technical failure in the delivery template of the
disclosure.
This is truly bad news for autonomists. It suggests that the state of ignorance
among consumers when facing complex transactions is not reparable by tweaking the
process of consent. No amount of precontractual targeted “education” or simplified
disclosures can solve the complexity paradox—the fact that a good autonomous
decision can only be made by experts, or by spending more time than people sensibly
care to. No amount of laboratory testing by the FTC of new disclosure forms for
residential mortgages can simplify what is at its core a dramatically complex and multi
dimensional decision problem—taking a home loan.8 And even the most lucid “know
before you owe” disclosure form will be only one of dozens—sometimes over 50!—
separate disclosures that borrowers receive at the loan closing.
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This is not to say that people are unable to make satisfying choices. They can,
and they often do (even in the mortgage setting) by relying on various cues: advice,
ratings, indexes, reputation, and their own experience. What the failure of mandated
disclosure suggests, however, is that the regulatory paradigm of informed consent—the
autonomists’ vision of a non boilerplate universe—is not feasible. The regulatory
agenda that requires the sophisticated party to provide comprehensive information to
its clients so as to help the clients reach autonomous educated choices has never
worked—not in medicine, not in consumer loans, not in privacy, not in a long list of
fields in which it was and continues to be practiced. True, this agenda might fit better
with ideal notions of democratic process and personal empowerment or with shallow
notions of transparency, but the complexity of the decisions rips a cleft between the
vision and the reality.
Can informed consent to contract boilerplate succeed where medical informed
consent failed? In an important way, making a good decision about legal terms of
consumer contracts is more difficult than making an informed consent to a medical
treatment. The risks and rewards affected by the medical decision are far more intuitive
and significant to most people than those implicated by consumer boilerplates. People
care more about physical pain and good health than damages for breach of contract or
arbitration.
Further, it is more difficult to make an informed choice of boilerplate terms
because the tradeoffs are less clear. When making a medical decision, the patient can
safely request the best procedure, which will yield the highest chances of success and
health. Cost of treatment, while an important issue, need not be traded off because it is
a matter to be settled by the insurance administrators and policy makers, not by the
doctor and patient. In consumer contracts, a good decision for the consumer does have
to trade off quality against the price. Many consumers, for example, prefer to buy
airfares that are cheaper even if nonrefundable. They opt for a harsh legal restriction—
an entire loss of an unused ticket—to enjoy the substantial price reduction it comes
with. And smart consumers (should be advised to) turn down extended warranties
offered by retailers because the price is a rip off.9 As products become more complex,
the price/rights tradeoffs are harder to make. Is the discounted cellphone worth the
early termination penalty? Is a lower mortgage APR worth the prepayment penalty? Is
the insurance on a rental car worth the premium? People vary in ways that make the
answers to these dilemmas dependent on subtle factors, most of which are hard to
quantify and resolve methodically. Do we really think that there is a way to prepare
people, through a better precontractual disclosure ritual, towards a meaningful
informed trade off of such complex tradeoffs?
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To her remarkable credit, Radin never once in the book refers to informed
consent, or to other versions of “heightened” disclosure, as the cure all to the problem
of boilerplate elimination of default legal rights. This restraint deserves mentioning
because disclosure and informed consent have become the predominant instinct of
many prominent autonomists, the fallback regulatory cure to various actual perceived
consumer protection shortcomings.10 Perhaps Radin is persuaded, like I am, that
disclosures cannot solve the problem she diagnoses, of non consent. But I suspect that
she does not advocate informed consent because her preferred intervention is more
ambitious. Firms would be happy to abide by any heightened disclosure standard, as
long as they can safely muscle in their terms to regulate the deal. It is exactly this
objection to firms’ power to regulate that justifies Radin’s preference for a more
powerful regulatory response. Rather than regulate the information and the consent
process, the polity should regulate the substance of contracts. Because the substance of
boilerplates is so intolerable—boilerplates drafted by profit seeking firms replace the
more equitable baseline entitlements that the polity chose to offer as a benchmark to
all consumers—not even informed agreement could make it kosher.
Indeed, Radin thinks that “there are strong non economic arguments against
treating all baseline entitlements as easily waivable” (p. 107). In other words, these
baseline entitlements ought to be regarded as stronger than default rules. Various such
non waivable rights already exist in consumer contracts, such as the prohibition on
usury, on various forms of discrimination, or mandatory cooling off periods. In Radin’s
autonomist regime, the right to jury trial, to participate in a class action, to a substantial
warranty, to expectation damages, to fair use rights in digital content, and various
others, should be elevated to a quasi mandatory status. No more boilerplate opting out.
The problem of ignorance of the legal terms, then, is a distraction, and Radin’s
case against boilerplate does not rest on it, nor does it purport to solve it. It is a
distraction, because equal or even greater levels of ignorance would persist even in a
non boilerplate world (this is the conclusion of my Myth #1). It is a distraction because
there is no way to solve the state of ignorance, given the failure of informed consent
(this is the conclusion of my Myth #2). And it is a distraction because the objective of
the book is not to solve consumers’ ignorance through some hocus pocus “best
practices” for meaningful consent. Rather, the objective is to replace the firm favored
terms with a bundle of guaranteed rights that no mass market contract can delete.
II.

THE PROBLEM OF INTOLERABLE TERMS

With the issue of ignorance set aside, we can turn to the heart of the debate
over consumer contract protection. Should the law mandate a set of basic provisions
that must be included in every mass market contract, and could not be waived by
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consumers? I will examine the case Radin makes for such intervention, and discuss the
inevitable trade offs that such regulatory technique entails.
A. Which Terms are Intolerable?
The first thing that jumps at you when you examine any firm drafted boilerplate
is how shamelessly uncharitable it is. “Nothing in fine print is ever good news” is a
prevalent sentiment among consumers—everything is drafted to serve the firm.
Needless to say, boilerplates are far more firm friendly than the background default
rules that they replace. Florencia Marotta Wurgler measured this bias and confirmed it
empirically in a large sample of software licenses.11 This is not unique to consumer
contexts; battles of the forms between sophisticated commercial parties are a direct
artifact of one sided B2B boilerplates.
This does not mean that the deals firms offer consumers are always one sided,
even in the legal terms. Firms offer a variety of consumer friendly legal arrangements,
such as generous return policies, long term express warranties, and free early
termination. But when they do, they make sure not to hide such attractive perks in the
fine print. They paste them, instead, in huge letters on storefronts and billboards. It is
mostly the stuff that consumers might not like (if they took the time to understand) that
is quietly tucked into the fine print.
So the great majority of the fine print terms are tacky. But a few are regarded as
truly intolerable. In recent years, several categories of terms have made it into what are
known as “black lists” (and “gray lists”).12 These are the terms that autonomists consider
most harmful to consumers, and which ought to be presumptively (and sometimes
irrebuttably) unenforceable. What are some of these allegedly intolerable terms?
Arbitration clauses and class action waivers. Probably the most notorious fine
print term of present day is the mandatory arbitration provision, which eliminates
consumers’ access to a judicial forum, and often to class action. Autonomists view
arbitration as an inaccessible, expensive, procedurally limited forum, where
underfunded claimants are at disadvantage. They worry primarily about the class action
bar.13 When many consumers have similar small claims, pursuing them in arbitration
one by one is not a viable redress strategy. Largely for this reason, Radin argues that
“mandatory arbitration clauses should be disallowed in mass market deletion schemes”
(p. 183).
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Exculpatory clauses. A long standing staple of the consumer fine print are the
exculpatory clauses: disclaimers of warranties, limitations on remedies, “hold harmless”
provisions (relieving the firm of any future liability for injury), and various
indemnification terms. With so little to gain in redress, consumers have little incentive
to initiate any proceedings against the firm. Radin stops short of proposing to outlaw
these clauses outright, but insists that they should be disallowed unless consumers
“really are trading off rights for a lower price” (p. 185). A pattern of widespread use of
exculpatory clauses would be regarded as prima facie evidence that they are not
“chosen” by consumers, and prominent disclosures alone would also not suffice in
rendering these clauses enforceable. As a result, the law’s implied warranties and
generous remedies would be more than “sticky”—they would effectively become
nondisclaimable.
Privacy clauses. Boilerplate “privacy policies” attached to websites and digital
services give firms rights to collect personal information of users and profit from it in
various marketing and data sharing strategies. Since the information is “important to
personal identity,” Radin considers privacy rights as good candidates for entitlements
that are “fully inalienable”—something beyond the power of individuals to waive.
“Perhaps society as a whole might not agree that waiver of privacy rights should be
entirely determined by individuals” (pp. 176 77).
Intellectual property rights. Copyright law allows users to maker various fair uses,
but boilerplate license terms override these permissions and replaces them with express
prohibitions. Likewise, content that is otherwise not protected by IP law—such as
databases—is regularly protected by restrictive license agreements written by firms that
assembled these databases from public open sources. Radin thinks that when
consumers have no choice but to purchase access subject to such restrictions, their
“user rights should be treated as at least partially market inalienable.” They “are not
just any old default rules” because “a clause cancelling fair use and other user rights . . .
destroys, or at least destabilizes, the commitment enacted in legislation.” And so,
“widespread boilerplate schemes that obviate the legislated nonpropertization should
perhaps be disallowed, or at least be scrutinized carefully” (p. 172). Again, the hurdles
an agreement needs to clear before meeting her standard of negotiated mutually
beneficial bargain would make most mass market boilerplate restrictions on use
unenforceable.
In addition to these primary examples, autonomists want to see many other
consumer rights immune from opt out by boilerplate. For example, the proposal for
Common European Sales Law includes 81(!) mandatory rules, going far beyond the
examples above. They include all of the consumer’s remedies, withdrawal rights,
disclosure rules, interpretation rules, restitution rules, risk of loss provisions, limitations

on sellers’ right to cure, rules relating to notices and communications, interest for late
payments, grace periods, and much more.14
B. Boilerplate and the “Price Effect”
The point I am about to make about the “price effect” is not original. It is simple,
but far reaching in its implications. In a sentence, the “price effect” means that one
cannot evaluate whether boilerplate deletion of legal rights is good or bad for
consumers, without also looking at that price people are asked to pay for the
product+boilerplate package. This is not an “efficiency” perspective. It focuses solely on
the consumers’ well being, not on the firms’ profits. It identifies inevitable trade offs, by
asking what would consumers have to give up to secure the added protections that
autonomists want to mandate.
Despite this being a familiar perspective, I will reexamine it, for two reasons.
First, while the “price effect” is recognized by Radin, its implications are never
confronted in the book.15 The book never makes the argument that the proposed
protections will either have no price effect, or that consumers would be happy to pay
the price charged for them. Second, when the implications of the price effect are taken
into account—when it becomes somewhat clearer what consumers have to surrender in
order to enjoy the anti boilerplate protections—boilerplate arrangements might no
longer seem quite so repelling. While it is not my goal to determine which way the trade
off goes, the framework I adopt of recognizing the trade offs would help us see which
sub groups of consumers are more, and which are less, likely to benefit from the
mandatory first class legal terms that autonomists favor.
Let us begin by assuming that the rights that boilerplates delete are important.
They are important because they affect in an economically meaningful way consumers’
surplus. If that were not the case, a book about boilerplate contracts would not be
worth writing. The immediate implication of this assumption is that a
product+boilerplate bundle that deletes these rights eliminates important fragments of
value, and thus saves the firms some of the costs of doing business. This cost saving
allows firms that offer the depleted bundle to charge a lower price. Standard economics
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analysis shows that this implication holds regardless of the market power that firms
have.16
How should we think about this tradeoff, of rights versus discounts?
Unfortunately, there is no formula for an optimal balance. People might vary in their
preferences for legal rights. As Judge Frank Easterbrook recognized: “in competition,
prices adjust and both sides gain. ‘Nothing but the best’ may be the motto of a
particular consumer but is not something the legal system foists on all consumers.”17 If,
in fact, the rights boilerplates delete are pricey, many people would be happy to buy
products and services stripped of the baseline entitlements the law provides, so long as
they are rewarded with a significant price discount. Some, like James J. White, might sell
away their legal rights cheaply: “for a nickel or a dime, almost all of us would give up our
right to resell software and would agree to arbitrate.”18 Others might only do so for a
more significant discount. And a few, Radin probably among them, might find the
contractual rights so fundamental to their dignity that no discount would prompt them
to waive these entitlements. Ideally, people would be able to self select along
quality/price traits, and would not be forced to buy the package that fits a different sub
group, even if that package has the superficial allure of “protection.” Indeed, this is the
ultimate practice of autonomy, for a consumer to hold the metaphorical “dimmer” that
increases (or decreases) contractual protections, and with them the price paid.
But self selection is not feasible when firms cannot price differentiate, or when
transactions costs constrain firms to offer a uniform package. In this situation, a
desirable solution, both efficient and consistent with democratic values, is for vendors
to offer the bundles that match majoritarian preferences. Allowing a small minority to
impose its preferences on the majority of consumers, by enacting rules that mandate
the price/quality bundle that this small sub group prefers, would likely expel many who
cannot afford this package out of the market.
There is plenty of reason to think that for most people, getting a lower price is
the overriding goal. People shop at Walmart and at bargain basements, fly economy
class, stay at Motel 6, and send packages by ground shipping, knowing that higher
quality is available. They choose high deductibles for auto insurance, forgo the right to
return products bought from clearance aisles, and make nonrefundable deposits to lock
in low rates. In short, people seek price bargains everywhere. Why should they not seek
bargains also in the legal rights? Is there a sense in mandating minimum quality to the
very aspects of the deal that, truth be told, people care least about?
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Even when they pay top price for premium products, few consumers would
regard the overall value of the deal based on anything that boilerplate regulates, and
the alleged havoc it wreaks with their “baseline legal entitlements.” Consider Apple’s
boilerplate, one of the most grotesque boilerplates, mentioned in Radin’s book as an
exemplar of a nasty rights deletion scheme (p. 86). Are consumers exploited by Apple?
Is their situation equivalent to coercion or fraud? Not by what this picture tells:

This is the line of eager consumers outside one of Apple’s stores, on the day that
the iPhone 5 was launched. Lines like this were a global phenomenon. It is not a picture
of a market failure, nor of gullible consumers divested of their rights. Is the Apple store
a tortfeasor? Do these people look “more like being hit by a one of thousands of
dumped projectiles”? (p. 210).
Do not be mistaken: the boilerplate that these people are going to “accept” will
likely deny them the right to sue in a convenient court, will limit the warranty, will
prompt them to let their private information and geo locations be harvested by Apple
and its affiliates, and will restrict people’s IP rights in the content they will be posting
with their iPhones.19 When their turn in the queue will come to purchase the device,
these people will be entering the world of boilerplate horrors, “transport[ed] . . . to a
different legal universe where many of their background rights are deleted” (p. 210). To
my unsophisticated eye, less trained in autonomists’ notions of self determination
versus disenfranchisement, this picture tells a story of people delighted to purchase a
19

http://www.apple.com/legal/sla/docs/ios6.pdf

product, which they regard as enhancing their capabilities, which they will brandish
around victoriously. If polled, do you think these consumers would support legal
protections that might make them wait longer in line, and would force them to pay
more for the device? Would they be eager to disable popular (and free) apps like Apple
Maps or Google Local, which give them real time directions and locations, in return for
GPS tracking?
Ironically, it is likely that the worst deal these Apple customers can make is to
purchase from the Apple store better legal terms. In fact, they do have this choice: they
can buy the manufacturer’s extended warranty plan (“Apple Care”).20 Instead of the
standard terms (one year limited warranty), they can pay $100 extra and receive a more
generous warranty plan: two years, and coverage extended to include accidental
damage to the device. In supplying higher end legal terms, this scheme would probably
satisfy the “meaningful choice” that autonomists advocate. But it is a bad deal, because
it is an expensive insurance. It might be beneficial for clumsy users who accidently drop
their devices into the toilet, but to most other buyers a scheme of self insurance (and
greater care) is a smarter choice. In fact, even those who want the added coverage can
obtain it more cheaply through SquareDeal, or through the consumer’s credit card that
offers a free Extended Warranty Protection.21 When there is demand for better legal
protections, markets often supply them in separate, unbundled packages.
People buying popular product+boilerplate packages are demonstrating that
that they don’t care about the autonomists’ concerns over the legal rights that
boilerplate deletes. But maybe they should care. Maybe the rights to sue, to powerful
warranties, to be free from data mining, and to enjoy the full spectrum of fair use rights
in information should not be optional, but rather mandatory. Even if people want to
thoughtlessly trade away these rights for the superficial allure of a trendy gadget, or for
the short lived satisfaction of a petty discount, maybe the law should deny them this
option. What is implicated, perhaps, is more than the hedonistic gratification of iPhone
users. It is the rule of law, the “ideal of contractual ordering,” and “the apparatus of
democratic governance” (p. 40).
These are weighty arguments that view a liberal society as more than the free
exercise of bargain hunting consumerism. It is a view that runs deeply through Radin’s
book. For example, “in order to preserve a widely valued aspect of social affairs, a
society as a whole might not agree that waiver of privacy rights should be entirely
determined by individuals” (p. 177). Entitlements should be non waivable when they are
“components of ‘public’ regimes underwritten by the polity for the sake of the structure
of the polity itself” (p. 177). Because of their mass market character, boilerplates are
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deleting entire legislative schemes that are “properly public (placed in the care of the
polity, for the benefit of the polity as a whole)” (p. 212).
It is beyond the scope of this essay to enter this debate on paternalism in private
law—whether the maintenance of “widely valued aspects of social affairs” justify limits
on contracting, even in the absence of personal injury or of traditional forms of negative
externalities. Similar debates have been thoroughly consummated in the literature on
Informed consent. Should patients, for example, have the right to waive the ritual of
informed consent? There, too, a version of “mandatory autonomism” regards the stakes
as “public,” reaching beyond what individuals should be allowed to forgo. I have written
elsewhere that such views of informed choices and mandatory autonomism, when
applied to consumer boilerplate, “look more like threats to autonomy than protections
of it.”22 Because the issues governed by boilerplate are complex and largely unfamiliar,
mastering them can detract from one’s sense of control. And having to pay higher prices
unless you are smart and sophisticated enough to thoughtfully waive these rights would
make most people feel less autonomous. For many, the choice not to bother is the
ultimate liberator.
When people buy phones and iPads with superior functional features and
inferior boilerplate, for a price they consider worth waiting in a long line on a rainy day
to pay, and when they diligently return to this line every two years, knowing all too well
that there is a grotesque fine print attached, what breach of autonomy occurs? What is
the consumer protection crisis that would justify punishing their vendors with tort
liability, exemplary damages, and attorney fees? When these consumers install apps
that provide them with useful daily service, and instead of paying the service providers
they allow them to collect location and other personal data, what is the liberal theory
that renders such currency unacceptable? What is the public value that tells people that
they can no longer enjoy such bargains, and must instead pay for mandated modules of
these services with top money and real sacrifice?
C. The Problem of Regressive Cross Subsidies
Not all people, however, value their legal rights as cheaply as Jim White does (his
metaphorical nickel or dime). There may be a minority of citizens, I am guessing part of
a sophisticated elite, for whom the boilerplate rights deletion bargain is undesirable and
even offensive. For them, the degradation of consent and of legal entitlements cannot
be priced. They want the right to sue in courts, they want firm accountability measured
by full consequential damages for their harms, they want personal data to remain
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personal, and they want access to information to be regulated by IP law, not by license
agreements. If must, they are willing and able to pay more for this bundle of upgrades.
Unfortunately, meeting the preferences of such groups would require the entire
pool of consumers, including the vast majority indifferent to such privileges, to also pay
more. And so everyone will pay, for benefits that some are disproportionately likely to
enjoy. For example, allowing parties to recover unlimited consequential damages would
mean that high loss types would be subsidized by those with lower losses, or more
disturbingly, by those who took more care and thus suffered less injury.23 Currently,
most people can ship mail packages cheaply without much insurance, unless they pay
more for the coverage. A legal rule mandating full consequential damages for delayed
package shipping would spread the cost of such insurance across all customers,
benefitting those who ship more expensive items. Similarly, mandatory rights to
withdraw from a contract would benefit those more likely to exercise such option.
Leisure travelers, for example, prefer to make careful plans and purchase nonrefundable
air travel, rather than pay for the right to withdraw. Business travelers who value and
exercise such withdrawal rights more end up paying large premiums for it. With a
mandatory rule, the leisure travelers would cross subsidize the (more affluent) business
clientele. And a legal rule that mandates access to court litigation and prohibits
arbitration clauses might also impose a cross subsidy. If this is more costly to firms, and
if they cannot charge differentiated prices based on people’s propensity to sue,
consumer with higher propensity would be cross subsidized by everyone else. 24
Cross subsidies are everywhere, but they should be particularly troubling when
they are regressive—when weaker and poorer consumers subsidize the sophisticated
and wealthier ones. The legal rights that boilerplates delete, if they were mandated,
would benefit the elite disproportionately more than others. First, the value of warranty
or of remedies is greater to those with larger consequential losses, and we know that
the affluent have more to lose than the poor. Second, in order to pursue any legal
right—a warranty, litigation in court, or even the right to know—an aggrieved party has
to understand what her rights are, and that they were violated, and be sophisticated
and patient enough to successfully invoke the legal procedures for redress. She also
needs to find an attorney that would take the case. On each of these counts,
sophisticated (that is, educated and wealthy) consumers fare comparatively better. They
are therefore the primary beneficiaries of the mandated protections.

23

Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract, 18
J. Legal Stud 105, 111 (1989). See also William Bishop, The Contract Tort Boundary and the
Economics of Insurance, 12 J. Legal Stud. 241 (1983); Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies,
Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 629, 659 (1988); Gwyn D.
Quillen, Contract Damages and Cross Subsidization, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1125 (1988).
24
Omri Ben Shahar, Mandatory Arbitration and Distributive Equity: An Essay on Access to Justice
(unpublished manuscript, 2013).

Protective policies are regressive in a way that is even more offensive to notions
of distributive fairness when the protection they secure, even if furnished to all, is
ranked low in the order of priorities by lower income people. Privacy rights are an
example. The case against firms collecting big data has to do more with the interest “to
preserve a widely valued aspect of social affairs” than with any individual harm (p. 177).
It is the concern over the “character of society” that a sophisticated elite demands, but
that most citizens do not recognize and would have a hard time even articulating, not to
mention affording. Mandating such conception of autonomy on the entire citizenry and
asking the lower middle class to finance this arrangement by paying higher prices is
inequitable and coercive.
CONCLUSION: WHAT IS THE HARM?
“Boilerplate” goes out with a bang. The degradation fine print is alleged to bring
about calls for regulation, but the tools of contract law (especially the doctrine of
unconscionability) are too limp. If the fine print is part of the product that people
purchase, why not regulate it the way product safety is regulated, through products
liability law? If widespread denial of legal rights is equivalent to the mass distribution of
defective products, isn’t tort law more appropriate than contract law to regulate the
effects of such widespread harms? (pp. 209 216)
This is an immensely creative idea, surely to become a legacy of the book, and it
deserves careful attention beyond what I can offer in the remaining pages. My
comments in the previous section meant to highlight the unintended consequences of
such liability scheme on prices, affordability, and cross subsidies. And so while I am
skeptical whether the proposed tort would benefit consumers, it no doubt benefits the
discussion. It is a welcome new framework, because it focuses the debate on the
fundamental issue: what is the harm. It offers a common language for autonomists and
boilerplate apologists. So let me say, in concluding, a few words on where this
conversation might go.
To promote a new tort claim, autonomists would have to develop an account of
harm that has real victims. They will have to identify better poster cases than they
currently have. For two decades, the wrath of autonomists has been aimed against the
case of ProCD v. Zeidenberg, the precedent that allowed firms to “shrinkwrap” the fine
print with the product without giving customers the opportunity to read it prior to
purchase.25 But the plaintiff in the case, Mr. Zeidenberg, evokes very little sympathy. He
bought a $150 CD ROM that contained digital phone listings from over 3000 directories,
assembled laboriously by ProCD at a cost of over $10 million. Opportunistically, he then
began to sell commercial access to these data, in competition with ProCD, despite the
not surprising contractual prohibition in the shrinkwrap license. It is also worth
mentioning that a less restrictive, but far more expensive, license was obtainable from
25
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ProCD, but Zeidenberg—the ultimate free rider—decided to buy the cheaper, personal
use package. He then had the hutzpah to argue that he did not have an opportunity to
read the fine print in advance (because it was sealed in the package) and therefore
should not be bound to it.
Or take another major exhibit in autonomists’ hall of shame: the Supreme Court
case, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, Which required state courts to enforce mandatory
arbitration clauses.26 The Concepcions’ complaint was that they were charged sales tax
on phones that were promised to be “free,” which they received when signing up for
AT&T service. The Concepcions did receive two free phones, and the charge $30.22 was
based on the phones’ retail value (and was passed on to the government). Is this
deception? Fraud? Even if the ad of “free phones” is incomplete in leaving out the tax
charge (but recall that autonomists don’t likes fine print in advertising either), this is
hardly a banner case for the plight of consumers. The Concepcions, leading a well oiled
class action charge, suffered as microscopic an injury as one could imagine.
The focus on “what is the harm” has important implications also for boilerplate
apologists. It is already recognized that fine print has the potential to undermine the
value that people believe they purchased, in areas such consumer credit and insurance.
Firms, for example, should not be able to run ads promising castles in the sky and then
disclaim them in fine print. Laws against fraud and deception deal with such practices.
But boilerplate can inflict more elusive forms of deceit and harm that escape the rigor of
anti fraud law. In another important work on boilerplate, Oren Bar Gill has shown how
firms reduce the perceived price of their products by hiding various charges in the fine
print, particularly by back loading costs onto long term price dimensions.27 These are
harms not due to “baseline entitlements” like arbitration or exculpatory clauses. Rather,
such practices are harmful because they undermine the price effect dynamics, they
disrupt competition, and impose disproportionate burdens on the least sophisticated
consumers. Boilerplate apologists would be wise to assess these potential harms, and
harness Radin’s tort law framework in addressing them.
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